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THE DEATH OF JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM
DAVID A. STRAUSS*

If we are talking about what happened during the Bush
Administration, “The Death of Judicial Conservatism” looks like it is
either a misprint or the deluded ramblings of a liberal who did not get
the memo. But I think it is fair to say that one of the lessons we have
learned in the wake of the Bush Administration’s appointments to the
Supreme Court is that judicial conservatism no longer exists in any
significant form. Or at least so I argue here.
To say that judicial conservatism has died is not to say that its
opposite, judicial liberalism or progressivism, has flourished. It is
clearer than ever that people who hoped for the revival of the Warren
Court—a court that had an agenda to be at the forefront of what it
considered to be social reform in a generally liberal direction—had
better give up that hope for at least a generation. That is an obvious
lesson of the Bush appointments. President Bush’s appointees, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, are young (by the standards of
Supreme Court appointees)1 and extremely able. We can expect them
to be on the Court for a long time, and we can expect them to write
important and influential opinions. Those Justices quite clearly have
no interest in reviving Warren Court liberalism.
It has also become clear that, when a Republican is President, the
judicial appointments process is controlled by a wing of the
Republican Party that is, to say the least, hostile to the kind of
2
Supreme Court that liberals or progressives might want. That wing of
* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. I am
grateful to Christopher Schroeder for the invitation to deliver the lecture from which this article
is derived, and to him and the other members of the audience on that occasion.
1. See Kevin T. McGuire, Are the Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment of Tenure on
the U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.unc.edu/~kmcguire/papers/tenure.pdf (finding the average
age of Supreme Court appointees between 1851 and 2005 is in the mid-50s).
2. Cf. William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns,
42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 462–72 (2001) (discussing the role that judicial nominations
played in the 2000 election, including pre-election predictions that, if elected president,
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the Republican Party is also deeply committed to making sure that
judicial appointments carry out its principles.3 This is not a judgment;
it is just a fact. Presidents of both political parties have used their
4
Supreme Court appointments to pursue a political agenda, and there
is not necessarily anything wrong with that. I do think, however, it is
accurate to say that people with a clear agenda dominated the judicial
appointments process in the Bush Administration.
When President Bush tried to appoint his counsel, Harriet Miers,
to the Supreme Court, he was rebuffed not by the Democrats but by
people in his own party. These Republicans were concerned not just
about whether she was distinguished enough to be appointed to the
Supreme Court but also about whether she was sufficiently “reliable”
5
and committed to certain views. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party
did not have the inclination or the ability to fight the conservative
appointments that the President’s party wanted him to make.
Put all of those things together—the exceptional ability and
relative youth of the two most recent appointments, the already
conservative character of the Court, the Republican Party’s
commitment to making conservative appointments, and the
Democrats’ relative lack of ability to use the Court to advance an
agenda—and the idea that there might be a revival of something like
the Warren Court in the next generation is, in a word, chimerical. That
is pretty obvious. What is less obvious—and a little paradoxical—is
that we are also dealing with something that can fairly be
characterized as the end of judicial conservatism.

George W. Bush would appoint “strict constructionists” who would likely decide cases in a
manner well-received by Republicans).
3. Cf. Cliff Schecter, Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party’s March to the Right,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1667 (2002) (finding that the predominant vocal members of the
Republican Party since the early Clinton years have been increasingly right-wing on issues
connected with the Court such as “abortion, guns, and minority rights”).
4. Franklin Roosevelt used his extensive tenure in the White House to make
appointments that secured his New Deal programs. Ronald Reagan tried to achieve the same
goal in a “Conservative Revolution.” See Graeme Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in
His Own Image, 71 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1985) (analyzing President Roosevelt’s and President
Reagan’s judicial appointments).
5. See David K. Kirkpatrick, After Miers, the Right Is Expecting More, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/politics/politicsspecial1/
30confirm.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=After Miers, the Right is Expecting More&st=cse (quoting
various conservative commentators and politicians regarding their distrust of Miers’ political
agenda).
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How can it be that, if the liberals have been vanquished, the
conservatives have not triumphed? To begin thinking about that
question, we must ask: what exactly is judicial conservatism? What
does it mean to be a conservative Supreme Court Justice?
Let me start with three things that judicial conservatism cannot be.
First, some conservatives say that being a judicial conservative means
6
following the original understandings of the Constitution. This means
that conservative judges should adhere to the intentions or the
understandings of the people who drafted or ratified the Constitution;
in the most common current formulation, they should look at how the
Constitution was understood at the time when its various provisions
were ratified.7 But originalism cannot be what it means to be a judicial
conservative, for several reasons.
For one thing, the idea that Justices can interpret the Constitution
by uncovering the understandings or intentions of the Framers has
8
been repeatedly discredited, beginning with Thomas Jefferson. The
9
first problem is that it is not doable. It is hard enough to figure out
what the Framers were thinking more than two hundred years ago.
Then even if you do figure that out, you have to apply the Framers’
thoughts to our completely different world—one which the Framers
could not possibly have foreseen.10 Even if you could do all of that,
why would it be a good idea? To paraphrase Jefferson, why should we
11
be ruled by people who are long dead? Underlying all of this is an
even bigger risk: not that we will be ruled by the dead, but rather that

6. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 626 (1994) (describing conservatism as
originalism but not endorsing this view).
7. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 133, 143 (1990).
8. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721–22 (2003) (analyzing Thomas Jefferson’s belief that “[t]he earth
belongs in usufruct to the living” and that laws from one generation should not bind another
generation).
9. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 659–66 (1987)
(arguing that an interpreter, no matter how intellectually responsible, necessarily imposes his
own historical judgments when contextualizing the Framers’ intents).
10. Id. at 665.
11. “Can one generation bind another and all others in succession forever? I think not. The
Creator has made the earth for the living, not the dead. Rights and powers can only belong to
persons, not to things, not to mere matter unendowed with will.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to John Cartwright, Major in the British Royal Navy (1824), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON MEMORIAL EDITION 16, 48 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., 1903–04).
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living people will claim to be following the original understandings
when, in fact, they are just following their own views.12
But even if originalism could somehow be justified, and made to
work, there is no reason to view it as a conservative approach to the
Constitution. Originalism is by no means something that has
13
historically been identified with people who are called conservatives.
The most influential originalist judge of the last hundred years was
Justice Hugo Black, and he was not a conservative at all: he was a
mainstay of the Warren Court. Justice Black was far more influential
in carrying out what he saw as the original understandings than any of
the present-day conservative originalists.14 That does not prove that
originalism is a distinctively liberal approach—it may just be a highly
manipulable approach—but it is not a distinctively conservative
approach either.
The two Bush appointees show no signs of being tempted to be
originalists. In their confirmation hearings they did not embrace
15
originalism. In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts did
not ever say something like, “I believe the Constitution should be
16
interpreted according to the original understandings.” Justice Alito
made a fleeting reference to the original understandings in a list of
things that he would take into account.17 But neither Justice identified
himself as an originalist, as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would
18
(and have). My hypothesis is that originalism proved useful to
conservatives when they were attacking what they saw as a mistaken
12. Powell, supra note 9, at 661.
13. Young, supra note 6, at 619.
14. David A. Strauss, Symposium Essays on Originalism: II. Originalism and Precedent:
Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 975 (2008).
15. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate,
109th Cong. 55 (2005); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be
an Associate Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United
States Senate, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html.
16. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate,
109th Cong. 55 (2005).
17. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be an Associate
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate,
109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html.
18. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989).
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status quo, just as originalism proved useful to Justice Black when he
was attacking the pre-New Deal status quo.19 But Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito have spent their careers in a period when
the Supreme Court was resolutely conservative, so they are mostly
comfortable with the status quo, and originalism does not appeal to
them.
So judicial conservatism is not a commitment to the original
understandings. The second thing that judicial conservatism is not, is
so-called “strict constructionism.” Often, a conservative politician will
call for judges to be strict constructionists. But what does strict
constructionism mean? What is the antonym of strict
constructionism? If strict constructionism means following the law,
then saying a judge is not a strict constructionist just means that you
disagree with his or her decisions. At one time in our history, strict
constructionism had a fairly clear meaning: in the early days of the
Republic, it meant that the powers of the federal government would
be narrowly confined.20 That was the Jeffersonian position,21 in
opposition to the view of Alexander Hamilton and Hamilton’s allies,
who thought the powers of the federal government should be given a
more expansive interpretation.22 Whether Jefferson’s view was right or
not, it was a coherent view of what strict construction means: the
federal government’s powers should be strictly limited.
That, however, is not where today’s conservatives are going when
they call for strict construction. I will return to this point later, but I
think what “strict construction” usually means today is: “Roe v. Wade
23
was wrong.” There are reputable people who think Roe v. Wade is
19. Strauss, supra note 14, at 975.
20. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196
(Univ. Press of Virginia 1994) (describing Jefferson’s strict theory of constitutional
interpretation); CALEB PERRY PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 70 (Peter Smith 1967) (1953) (“Jefferson insisted on a strict construction of the
Constitution and founded a party to perpetuate his constitutional principles.”).
21. MAYER, supra note 20, at 196; PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 70.
22. MAYER, supra note 20, at 196 (describing the divergence in Jefferson and Hamilton’s
theories of constitutional interpretation); PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 126 (contrasting
Jefferson’s strict-construction theory of constitutional interpretation with Hamilton’s looseconstruction theory of constitutional interpretation).
23. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS:
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006) and JAN CRAWFORD, SUPREME
CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT (2007)) (“Other times references to the abortion issue are masked by
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wrong; the constitutional status of the right to abortion is an
important and complex issue. But if what you want to say is that Roe
v. Wade is wrong, then say that. Don’t start talking about strict
construction, which either means something entirely different or has
no useful meaning at all.
The third meaning that judicial conservatism might have is
something like “just follow the law.” Liberals, according to this
account, make up new law to fit their moral and political views, while
conservatives decide cases in accordance with the law. If we put aside
the talk about liberals and conservatives for a moment, there is an
interesting issue here. Why does a Court or a Justice need a theory, an
approach, or an ideology? Why not just be a judge and decide the
cases? That is a powerful question, and I will try to answer it before I
am done—although it will be only a partial answer. For now the thing
to bear in mind is that in most of the cases that reach the Supreme
Court, good lawyers will disagree about what the right answer is. Of
course there are plenty of legal questions to which a good lawyer can
give only one answer. But most of those questions do not find their
way to the Supreme Court; most of them do not find their way into
court at all. In almost any high-profile, controversial case in the
Supreme Court, good lawyers can disagree about the answer and still
be good lawyers.24
For that reason, just saying “I am going to decide the cases in
accordance with the law” only gets a judge so far. When it comes to
Supreme Court cases, people can share that commitment, act
conscientiously and in complete good faith, and still disagree most of
obfuscation, such as when presidents like George W. Bush talk about appointing nominees who
are ‘strict constructionists’ or those who will not ‘use the bench to write social policy.’”);
Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407,
423 (2005) (citing Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the
People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 776 (1991)) (“‘Strict construction’ is a
slogan, a signaling device to denote types of judges who will produce certain outcomes.”);
see also Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., Presidential Debate (October 3, 2000) (transcript
available at 2000 WL 1466168 (F.D.C.H.)) (“And when the phrase ‘strict constructionist’ is
used, and when the names of Scalia and Thomas are used as benchmarks for who would be
appointed, those are code words . . . for saying that the governor would appoint people who
would overturn Roe v. Wade.”).
24. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 621–22 n.39 (2000) (citing George Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1984)) (“[C]ases wind up in
court in direct proportion to their legal difficulty . . . since litigation presupposes two mutually
exclusive positions each of whose adherents has some reason to believe that she will prevail.”).

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

6/15/2009 3:12:43 PM

LESSONS LEARNED: THE SUPREME COURT

7

the time. Their disagreement is the result not of a difference in legal
skill, but of a difference in vision, in their sense of fairness, in their
ideas about the role the Court should play. That is why it is not
enough to say that a judicial conservative is someone who decides the
case in a lawyer-like fashion. The important question is: what does
judicial conservatism mean at the point where good lawyers disagree?
None of those three approaches—originalism, “strict
construction,” or just-follow-the-law—gives a plausible account of
what judicial conservatism might be. What might a plausible form of
judicial conservatism consist of, then? One important and timehonored view is that judicial conservatives believe in judicial
restraint.25 Now, when you talk about “judicial restraint” and “judicial
activism,” you are at the risk of just engaging in rhetoric and
attaching labels. But judicial restraint can be given a coherent content;
it is a view that was clearly and forcefully articulated at one point in
our history.26 The view is that the courts should not overturn the
decisions of the people’s elected representatives except in extreme
cases.27 If Congress or the state legislatures do something truly
irrational or truly indefensible, then, but only then, the courts should
28
step in and declare it unconstitutional. This is sometimes
characterized as the “rule of the clear mistake.”29 It has to be a clear
mistake by the elected branches of government or else the Court
30
should not get involved.
Probably the most vigorous proponent of this view in the Supreme
31
Court’s history was Justice Felix Frankfurter, a Franklin Roosevelt

25. See Young, supra note 6, at 626–27 (describing judicial restraint as one of “three
primary methodological themes that . . . represent the basic tenets of modern conservative
constitutionalism”).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12
(1996) (“The position can be found as well in the writings of Justice Holmes, the first Justice
Harlan, Justice Frankfurter, and, most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist.”).
27. Young, supra note 6, at 626–27.
28. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 11–12 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139–52 (1893)).
29. Id.
30. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (limiting judicial action to those occasions “when those
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one—so clear that it is not open to rational question”).
31. See FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 301 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., Reynal &
Company, Inc. 1960) (“I regard Thayer’s essay [about the limited role of the judiciary] as the
most important single essay. . . . He was a very great man.”).
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appointee, and possibly the most famous statement of this view is
Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.32 The majority of the Supreme Court, in fact
everybody but Justice Frankfurter, voted to strike down a West
Virginia law that required schoolchildren to say the Pledge of
Allegiance.33 Justice Frankfurter wrote an emotional and personal
dissent in which he said that while he sympathized with religious
minorities—the children in the case were Jehovah’s Witnesses whose
religious creed forbade them to salute the flag—he simply did not
34
think it was the Court’s job to strike down the law. The judgment of
the people of West Virginia was that schoolchildren should be saying
the Pledge of Allegiance, and that, Justice Frankfurter said, was not
obviously unconstitutional—in fact, the Court, with mostly different
members, had upheld a compulsory flag salute law just a few years
earlier.35 Justice Frankfurter disapproved of the law, and there was a
plausible argument that the law was unconstitutional, but, because it
was not entirely clear that the law was unconstitutional, Justice
Frankfurter voted to uphold it.
Even Justice Frankfurter did not practice this form of judicial
restraint consistently throughout his career on the Court, and since he
left the Court in 1962, the number of Justices who have practiced
judicial restraint of this kind is zero.36 Certainly nobody on the Court
today holds this view of the Court’s role. Every Justice since
Frankfurter has voted to declare measures unconstitutional that were
not obviously unconstitutional. We are accustomed to the idea that
the Court will do this, and no Justice since Frankfurter has even
advocated his form of judicial restraint.
It is theoretically possible that this form of “clear mistake” judicial
restraint could be revived: it has some important academic

32. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 646–71.
35. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
36. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 13 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist has often endorsed the rule
of clear mistake, and he is probably the most consistent proponent of this view in recent
decades. But in cases involving affirmative action, the Chief Justice speaks in quite different
terms; here his method is more like a form of independent interpretive judgment.”).
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advocates.37 As far as Acts of Congress are concerned, such an
approach might amount to the effective end of judicial review,
because it is hard to imagine Congress passing a law so extreme that it
would be obviously unconstitutional. It is more likely that a local
government, or conceivably a state government, might do something
that makes you shake your head in embarrassment and amazement.38
But the current Court, including the so-called conservatives on the
39
current Court, is nowhere near being so restrained.
There are many examples, but two recent ones are especially
notable. The Court has struck down two significant provisions of the
40
McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act, an important
statute that was the product of extensive deliberation in Congress41
and that, whatever else might be said of it, was not irrational or
transparently unconstitutional.42 Both George W. Bush appointees
voted to invalidate these provisions.43 In one of the cases, Chief Justice
Roberts led the charge with an opinion saying that when in doubt the
44
Court should err on the side of protecting political speech. That
credo may be an admirable one, but it is exactly the opposite of
judicial restraint.
In the 2007-2008 Supreme Court term, the most dramatic example
of a decision that tossed judicial restraint overboard was District of
Columbia v. Heller, the case in which the Court struck down the
District of Columbia’s gun control ordinance on the ground that it

37. E.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 254–84 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006).
38. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 264 (1988) (citing the possibility that “Congress and the state legislatures
might not be equally likely to enact unconstitutional statutes” as creating a difference in the
content of litigation in state and federal courts).
39. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 13 (describing Rehnquist’s selective application of the
rule of clear mistake).
40. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (holding that restrictions on issue
ads in the months preceding elections are unconstitutional); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759
(2008) (holding that the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment” violated the First Amendment by
imposing a substantial burden on the right to use personal funds for campaign speech).
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
42. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court (and, I think,
the country) loses when important precedent is overruled without good reason, and there is no
justification for departing from our usual rule of stare decisis here.”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2659 (“[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting
political speech rather than suppressing it.”).

DO NOT DELETE

10

6/15/2009 3:12:43 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 4:1

violated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.45
Maybe that decision was right; maybe it was wrong—that is an
argument we can have on another day. But no one, I believe, can
46
seriously say that the statute was obviously unconstitutional. There
are many other examples, but those two examples should be enough
to dispel any idea that judicial conservatism today takes the form of
severe Frankfurter-like judicial restraint.
If judicial conservatives today do not believe in judicial restraint,
then what do they believe in? Perhaps the core of judicial
conservatism is protecting federalism and states’ rights. The idea
would be that the Court’s most important job is to protect state and
local governments—the forms of government closest to the people—
47
from the remote, overbearing federal government. There were hints,
during the Rehnquist era, that the Supreme Court was moving in this
direction; in some celebrated cases, the Rehnquist Court, reversing a
trend that had existed since the New Deal, struck down acts of
Congress on the grounds that they exceeded Congress’ powers under
the Commerce Clause.48
I am pretty confident that the Court will not continue to move
seriously in that direction. The two Justices who believed most
strongly in federalism have both left the Court—Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.49 Their replacements’ careers have
been, in both cases, focused almost exclusively on the federal
government,50 and Justices Roberts and Alito do not seem to be

45. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
46. Cf. id. at 2816 (holding that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited).
47. See, e.g., Ernest Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 874, 883–84 (2006) (noting the special role that federalism plays in protecting individual
liberties).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that possession of a
firearm near a school is not an economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 is unconstitutional as exceeding Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause).
49. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor showed their adherence to
federalist values by authoring United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), respectively. Chief Justice Rehnquist died on September 3, 2005,
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired from the Court on January 31, 2006.
50. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009).
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committed to federalism in anything like the same way as the Justices
they replaced.
This kind of biographical speculation is not totally convincing, but
what should be convincing is a particularly dramatic and recent
example of the current Court’s refusal to allow local governments a
measure of autonomy to deal with a sensitive and intensely local
problem. In 2007, the Court decided a case involving the efforts of
two local school boards to bring about racial integration in their
51
schools. The school boards in these cases used racial criteria in order
52
to make their schools less homogeneous. The Supreme Court said
that what the local school boards did was unconstitutional.53 The two
Bush appointees voted with the majority, and Chief Justice Roberts
wrote the strongly-worded prevailing opinion.
Here you have local school boards, addressing a local problem—
an intensely difficult local problem, having to do with sensitive issues
of education and racial dynamics—using their judgment and deciding
that they wanted to address the problem in a certain way. And the
Supreme Court tells them that they cannot do it. Again, whatever the
merits of the Supreme Court’s decision, the one thing you cannot say
is that this is a Court that cares deeply about local prerogatives and
protecting local governments from the intrusions of people in
Washington, D.C.
What makes this example particularly dramatic is that in two
54
cases—one that the Supreme Court reviewed and one that was
55
similar but did not reach the Supreme Court —prominent lower
court judges with strong conservative credentials voted to uphold
race-conscious integration plans precisely because those judges
thought that local educational authorities should not have their
decisions second-guessed by federal judges. In other words, the
Supreme Court had before it the conservative case for keeping the
federal government out of the business of local governments. But that
kind of judicial conservatism was flatly and unequivocally rejected by

51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
52. Id. at 2746–50.
53. Id. at 2758.
54. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 1162, 1193–96
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
55. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J.,
concurring).
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the conservatives on the Supreme Court, including the two Bush
appointees, without, it appears, so much as a second thought.56 I think
we can be confident in saying that the form of judicial conservatism
practiced by this Court is not one that is highly solicitous of the
prerogatives of state and local governments.
There are other examples. Heller, the Second Amendment case, is
one. Although Heller did not resolve the question whether the Second
Amendment applies to the states, the Court in Heller seemed
unmoved by the idea that, given the extreme variation in local
circumstances and attitudes across the country, gun control is another
issue that should be resolved on the local level rather than
constitutionalized and resolved by the Supreme Court in
57
Washington. But, for me at least, the school integration cases are the
clearest examples.
If judicial conservatism, post-Bush, is neither judicial restraint of
the Frankfurter variety nor federalism of the O’Connor variety, what
else might it be? Perhaps it is a libertarian view, the idea that the role
of the courts is to keep all government—federal government, state
58
government, and local government—generally in check. The threat
to individual freedom comes from government, and the Court’s
distinctive role is to protect individuals against government
overreaching.
That view of the judicial role is again more or less coherent,
although libertarians do have many difficult line-drawing problems
59
that call into question whether there is an underlying principle. And
libertarianism can go much further in cutting back on the government
than most of us would be willing to go.60 But there is some appeal—

56. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (“The plans here are not tailored to achieving a
degree of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits . . . .”).
57. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2820 (2008) (holding that the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual right to possess a
firearm for private use).
58. See Jeffrey Rosen, So What’s the ‘Right’ Pick?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/weekinreview/03rosen.html?scp=3&sq=So
What’s
the
‘Right’ Pick?&st=cse (explaining how the libertarian concept of judicial conservatism involves
“anti-government and pro-individual liberties”).
59. See supra note 58 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, who explains how
libertarian conservatives, despite being associated with originalism, sometimes show “real
commitment” to individual liberty rather than to “original understanding or judicial restraint”).
60. See Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of
Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 433 (2005) (explaining that according
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maybe even a lot of appeal—to the idea that protecting against
overreaching government is a good role for the courts to play.
Again there were glimmerings in the Rehnquist era that the Court
61
might have been moving in this direction. But again, a lesson of the
Bush years is that today’s judicial conservatives are not libertarians.
Exhibit A is last term’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, the case
62
involving the detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo. In that case, the
Court declared unconstitutional the statute that limited the detainees’
right to challenge their confinement.63 But there were four dissenters:
the two Bush appointees and the two people—Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas—whom President Bush took as his ostensible models
for those appointees.64 The Bush-era conservatives were comfortable,
as a constitutional matter, with what the government was doing in
Guantanamo.65
I do not want to suggest that the legal issues in Boumediene were
all straightforward or one-sided. But anyone who believes that the
courts’ role is to protect individual liberty from overreaching
government should find it extremely difficult to accept what the
government was doing in that case. The detainees were in
Guantanamo because the executive branch of the federal government
deliberately decided to hold people in a way that would escape
66
judicial scrutiny. The government chose Guantanamo because it
wanted to keep the detainees in a place where it could control them
completely, but where the executive branch lawyers thought the

to classical liberal theory, “this liberty thrives on the economic liberty of a free market, and the
political liberty of a minimal state”).
61. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 235
(Vicki Been et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2006) (1997) (explaining that after 1995, the Supreme
Court “limited the scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “revived the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal
power”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
63. Id. at 2240.
64. Id. at 2279.
65. See id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Detainee Treatment Act as
“the most generous set of procedural protections” and holding that it “adequately protects any
constitutional rights aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants may enjoy”).
66. See id. at 2252 (majority opinion) (noting that the United States contends that the
Suspension Clause affords the detainees no rights because the United States does not claim
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay where the detainees are being held).
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courts could not help them.67 Guantanamo was just foreign enough so
that aliens being held there could not assert their rights under the
Constitution, but not so foreign that the government would have, as a
68
practical matter, problems controlling what went on there.
Whether the government’s actions in dealing with these
individuals were morally acceptable, sensible, admirable, or necessary
is a complex question. But if you are a conservative judge who defines
judicial conservatism as a matter of using the courts to establish a
bulwark against an overreaching government, then your every instinct
should rebel against what the government was doing in Guantanamo.
You should tell the government that the one thing it cannot do is
effectively disable the courts from even entertaining a claim that the
government has overreached. Even if there is room for reasonable
disagreement about the level of constitutional protection the
detainees should receive, you should find it intolerable for the
government to choose a stratagem specifically to prevent the courts
from deciding that question.
The conservatives who dissented in Boumediene did not find the
government’s position intolerable. Whether the government’s position
in Boumediene was right or wrong is, in fact, a difficult question. But
you cannot say that the Justices who voted for that position are
libertarians who believe that the principal role of courts is to protect
against government—especially executive branch—overreaching. On
a major issue, their considered judgment was in favor of giving
substantial deference to the executive branch. Maybe that is the right
approach to take, but it is not libertarian.
If the conservatism of the Bush era is not judicial restraint,
federalism, or libertarianism, then what is it? I believe we are left with
a set of beliefs that, while it calls itself conservative, is unable to
support any coherent conservative creed. There is no coherent,
principled conservative explanation of what the role of the Supreme
Court should be in our system that corresponds to what so-called
conservative Justices—such as the Bush appointees—are committed

67. See id. (“The United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ [over
Guantanamo] . . . [but] contends, nevertheless, that Guantanamo is not within its sovereign
control.”).
68. See id. (stating that under the terms of the lease between the United States and Cuba,
the United States has “complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay, although
Cuba has “ultimate sovereignty” over the territory).
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to. This lack of a coherent conservative view of the role of the courts
is, I think, a lesson that has emerged from the Bush era.
Why does that matter? Academics and journalists like to identify
themes and ideologies among the Justices, so maybe it is
disappointing to them if today’s conservatives cannot articulate a
coherent conservative view of the role of the courts. But why should it
matter to anyone else? The conservative Justices—all of the Justices,
for that matter—go about their business, cast their votes, decide their
cases. Who cares that we cannot, as observers, figure out a coherent,
identifiably conservative view of what they are up to?
That question—a totally fair question—brings me back to one of
the points I began with. I said earlier that judicial conservatism cannot
consist of simply deciding cases in the way a good lawyer would,
because when a case gets to the Supreme Court, there is usually no
agreement among good lawyers on how the case should come out.
But suppose we accept that when cases get to the Supreme Court
there is usually an element in them that requires the Justices to think
about fairness, or public policy, or something like that. Why not just
say that, at that point, Justices—conservative or otherwise—should
just make the necessary judgment in good faith, as best they can?
Who cares if the judgments they make cannot be arranged in an
intellectually pleasing pattern that can be given a label like
“conservative” or “liberal”?
That view has a lot of common sense appeal. It may, however,
leave unanswered some important questions about the
appropriateness of the Supreme Court’s current role in our system of
government. Without a coherent, articulable account of what the
Justices should be doing, we may not be able to answer the question
of why, exactly, the Supreme Court gets to second-guess the
judgments made by the people’s elected representatives.
Historically, the most plausible liberal answer to this question is
that there are people in our society—political dissenters and racial
and religious minorities, for example—who do not get their fair share
in the political process, and the Court’s job is to stand up for those
69
70
people. That was essentially the Warren Court’s answer. The

69. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 86 (1980) (discussing the
proper role of the Supreme Court and explaining that “at least in some situations judicial
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possible conservative approaches that I have sketched also provide
plausible answers to that question. You can say, for example, that our
political system tends to centralize power too much and that without
the Court no one will pay sufficient attention to the prerogatives of
state and local governments. Alternatively you might say, on a
libertarian view, that governments tend to aggrandize themselves;
government officials tend to think that the solution to a problem is for
the government to exercise more power, and officials do not give
enough weight to the rights of individuals—whether they are locking
people up or regulating businesses—so judges should step in to
protect individuals against that systematic failure of the government.
That claim leaves plenty to debate about, but again, it is a plausible
answer to the question of how to justify the Supreme Court’s role in
our system.
Now, maybe we do not need an answer of this kind, either liberal
or conservative, to the question about the Supreme Court’s role in our
system. Maybe it is enough to say that because our system has, for a
while now, presupposed that the courts will play a certain role and has
worked well enough, we should leave things alone. Or maybe it is
enough to say simply that our system works better when significant
power is given to people with the background, orientation, and
incentives that are characteristic of Supreme Court Justices. But I am
uncertain whether either of those is a completely satisfactory
justification for the role that the courts play. And I doubt that today’s
conservatives would want to sign on to either of those justifications.
So Bush-era conservatives seem to be left without a coherent,
principled approach and without an explanation of why the Supreme
Court should be able to overturn decisions made by elected
representatives. The question remains, as we enter a post-Bush period
in which supposed judicial conservatives will continue to exercise
power, just what judicial conservatism is. If there is no good answer to
that question, then what is the justification for conservatives’ exercise
of the power that they have now gained?

intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes of representation seem
inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests”).
70. Id. at 3, 135.

